The Houthi offensive against ships transiting through the Red Sea has highlighted the fragility of this vital artery for international trade. Following the escalation triggered by the Israel-Palestine war, maritime insurance costs have soared, and many vessels have been diverted to alternative routes – for instance, around the southern tip of Africa – destabilising global supply chains. The crisis has also severely affected the Suez Canal, where traffic has fallen by about 50%, significantly cutting into Egypt’s crucial transit revenues. Despite international missions launched to ensure security in these waters and the ceasefire agreement signed in early May between the United States and the Houthis, regional security remains fragile. Beyond Houthi attacks, the Red Sea continues to be threatened by piracy and by an intensifying multinational arms race, dynamics that long predate the events of October 2023. The strategic importance of the Red Sea has drawn the attention of the United States, the United Kingdom, several European countries, Iran, India, and, more recently, Turkey, China, and Russia. In fact, in recent years, agreements have been explored or signed to establish military bases on the African shores of the Red Sea, involving Somaliland, Eritrea, Djibouti, and even war-torn states such as Sudan. 

In this context, how can security in the Red Sea be ensured? What role can regional actors play in easing tensions? Can the Council of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, or a new initiative along similar lines, still provide an effective framework? And, crucially, how can the Djibouti Code of Conduct, designed to combat piracy and armed robbery, be strengthened and made enforceable?